Securing China's Core Interests: The State of the Debate

Securing Chinas core interests the state of the debate in China JINGHAN ZENG YUEFAN XIAO AND SHAUN BRESLIN International Affairs 91 2 2015 245266 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs Published by John Wiley Sons Ltd 9600 Garsington Road Oxford ox4 2dq UK and 350 Main Street Malden MA 02148 USA The extent to which a rising Chinas core interests may or will clash with the interests of the existing dominant global power has been a topic of recurring interest for many yearsperhaps since Aaron Friedberg identified the potential for growing rivalry in 19931 Indeed the debate has been featured in some detail in the pages of this journal2 Primarily focusing on Chinas challenge to US interests in East Asia rather than on the global scale the attempt to identify when China might be able to achieve regional primacy supremacy or hegemony remains the name of the international politics game in Asia3 While this interest in Chinas rise did not exactly need to be given a renewed impetus the question of whether a new period of increased assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy had opened in 2009 or thereabouts brought a new dimension to the debates4 In this context disagreement has centred on first what it means or takes to be considered asser tive and second whether Chinese policy has fundamentally changed or not There is also a third dimension to the study of assertiveness what is China being assertive about Chinas leaders are not shy in asserting that there are a set of core interests hexin liyi that are nonnegotiable bottom lines of Chinese policy In the words of Xi Jinping We will stick to the road of peaceful development but will never give up our legitimate rights and will never sacrifice our national core interests No country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core interests or that we will swallow the bitter fruit of harming our sovereignty security or development interests5 1 Aaron Friedberg Ripe for rivalry prospects for peace in a multipolar Asia International Security 18 3 19934 pp 533 2 See eg Brantly Womack Beyond winwin rethinking Chinas international relationships in an era of economic uncertainty International Affairs 89 4 July 2013 pp 91128 Ian Clark China and the United States a succes sion of hegemonies International Affairs 87 1 Jan 2011 pp 1328 Rosemary Foot Chinese strategies in a UShegemonic global order accommodating and hedging International Affairs 82 1 Jan 2006 pp 7794 Shaun Breslin China and the global order signalling threat or friendship International Affairs 89 3 May 2013 pp 61534 Amitai Etzioni Is China a responsible stakeholder International Affairs 87 3 May 2011 pp 53953 3 Yuen Foong Khong Primacy or world order The United States and Chinas rise a review essay International Security 38 3 Winter 201314 p 154 4 See Alastair Iain Johnston How new and assertive is Chinas new assertiveness International Security 37 4 Autumn 2013 pp 748 Dingding Chen Xiaoyu Pu and Alastair Iain Johnston Debating Chinas assertive ness International Security 38 3 Winter 201314 pp 17683 5 Xi Jinping genghao tongchou guonei guoji liangge daju hangshi zou heping fazhan daolu de jichu Xi Jinping to better manage domestic and international situations and to lay a solid foundation to the path of peaceful development Jan 2013 httpnewsxinhuanetcompolitics20130129c114538253htm accessed 1 Feb 2015 INTA912FullIssueindb 245 05032015 142930 Jinghan Zeng Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin 246 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs In a similar vein the influential Chinese scholar Shi Yinhong has asserted that China should never give in while defending its core interests Only when it comes to noncore interests should it make some compromise in order to ease the pressure on other big powers6 So if compromise on core interests is ruled out it would make sense to identify what these interests are in order to better understand Chinas international security strategies and even possibly to predict what they might entail in the future Yet what these bottomline core interests are that China might or might not be more forcefully asserting remains open to question Michael Swaines analysis of the evolution of the use and definition of core interests with a focus on terri torial issues gives us a firm base from which to start7 The 2011 White Paper on Chinas peaceful development adds to this by defining core interests in general terms as including state sovereignty national security territorial integrity and national reunification Chinas political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development8 Yet when it comes to specifics the boundaries of core interests remain somewhat blurred and open to question This fuzziness may be deliberate and serve a good purpose As a US Congress report on Chinas core interests in the East China Sea pointed out maintaining an ambiguous position gives Beijing flexibility in handling the dispute internationally and prevents potential domestic criticism that it is not acting forcefully enough9 We do not claim to provide in this article a clear definitive and enduring under standing of what Chinas core interests actually are On the contrary the article will in fact further muddy the water and make things less clear It does this by turning the focus away from external perceptions of what China wants and how it might go about getting it and on to domestic debates within China about Chinas role and capabilities in world politics Specifically we focus on how Chinese academics and analysts are discussing and defining the nature of Chinas core interests and how best to protect them We do this by using a mixed quantitative and qualita tive analysis to study 108 articles written by Chinese scholars in Chinese that deal with the concept of Chinas core interests We do not claim either that the findings offer a radical new interpretation of Chinese thinking Our more modest aim is simply to provide hard empirical evidence of what these diverse views actually are and to open the Chinese debate up to a largely nonChinesereading audience In the process we hope to contribute to a broader understanding of how new political ideas concepts approaches and agendas become established in China When external ideas are adopted it often takes time for them to become sinicizedto be given a specific meaning and understanding that work in and arguably for the Chinese political context An example here might be the evolution 6 Shi Yinhong How to boost Chinas peaceful rise China Daily 18 May 2010 7 Michael Swaine Chinas assertive behavior part one on core interests China Leadership Monitor no 34 2010 pp 125 8 White Paper on Chinas peaceful development Beijing Information Office of the State Council Sept 2011 9 Caitlin Campbell Ethan Meick Kimberly Hsu and Craig Murray Chinas core interests and the East China Sea USChina Economic and Security Review Commission 2013 httpwwwusccgovsitesdefaultfiles ResearchChina27s20Core20Interests20and20the20East20China20Seapdf accessed 2 Feb 2015 INTA912FullIssueindb 246 05032015 142930 Securing Chinas core interests 247 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs of thinking over the nature of Chinese soft power and how to utilize it Domes tically when new concepts are put forward often by Chinas leaders they are not always clearly defined frequently the process of filling the concept with real meaning occurs subsequently and incrementallyas for example with the concept of the China dream This process we argue is also part of what is happening with the notion of core interests Our overarching conclusion is that despite its increasing use by the Chinese government to legitimize its diplomatic actions and claims the concept of Chinas core interests remains a rather vague one With different voices from within China using different definitions the boundaries between core and noncore interests are both movable and porous This we argue not only makes it difficult to predict Chinese diplomatic behaviour on key issues but also allows external observers a rich source of opinions from which to select to help support preexisting views on the nature of China as a global power Researching Chinas core interests Our intention in this article to uncover different thinking on and definitions of core interests suggests a prior understanding that there is a considerable degree of pluralism in Chinese thinking This is not to say that each of these different opinions carries the same political weight clearly what Chinas top leaders say and do has more significance than a short article in a specialist academic journal And as we shall show in the case of core interests as in other areas the promotion of an idea by a political leader can often act as the starting point for subsequent academic discussion Nevertheless we think it is important to broaden the focus beyond the political leadership for three reasons First as the International Crisis Group has shown in relation to the South China Sea a lack of coordination among different agencies can result in competing and at times conflicting security policy goals and actions10 Second different voices coming from China can and do elicit different external responses that in turn have their own impacts on Chinese discourse and policy Indeed one of our key findings here is a concern among Chinese intellectuals that different messages emanating from within China are misleading international observers about the nature of Chinese claims and objectives For example an analyst from the Central Party School CPS has complained that some hardline hawkish nationalist viewpoints kidnap national interests11 by presenting minority views as if they were mainstream expressions of Chinas grand strategy There are echoes here of the Chinese debate over the creation of a China threat thesis in the 1990sthe idea that some foreign forces are looking for whatever evidence they can marshal to show that China is a threat to the global order and thereby justify mobilizing alliances to try to prevent or at least manage Chinas rise 10 International Crisis Group Stirring up the South China Sea I Asia Report no 223 Beijing and Brussels 2012 11 Liu Jianfei Guanyu jin jinian zhongguo waijiao de fansi Reflections on Chinas diplomacy in recent years Xueshu zhengming Academic contention no 4 2012 p 44 INTA912FullIssueindb 247 05032015 142930 Jinghan Zeng Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin 248 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs This fragmentation and pluralism result in part from the opportunities that new political agendas provide for domestic actors As Wang Yizhou points out in an interview with Zhang Diyu there is an incentive for agencies to define their own interests as being core in the hope that doing so will attract more resources and power For example the grain for green project has been promoted as a national core interest by those associated with the forestry sector12 While in this example there are no negative consequences for Chinas national image and foreign policy there is a consensus of sorts on the need for better coordination domestically in order to present a consistent face internationally Third quite simply we believe that there is real plurality in Chinese debates To be sure it is constrained pluralitythere are places where Chinese analysts do not want to go and some policy truths that cannot be challenged But this still leaves considerable space for discussion debate and disagreement which is reflected both in this study and in previous similar projects undertaken on Chinese debates on the nature of regime legitimacy Moreover there is not just a supply of different opinions but a demand for them too There is direct evidence of this soon after a previous article on legitimacy was published13 a central body of the Chinese Communist Party CCP asked for a summary report of it for internal use14 Research methods quantitative content analysis plus interviews This study builds on previous uses of content analysis to study Chinese academic discourses15 Having first identified 108 Chinese academic articles concerning Chinas core interests published between 2008 and 2013 from the China Academic Journals Fulltext Database16 we then designed a coding manual based on a preliminary reading of a representative sample After piloting an early version of the coding scheme two coders each read all 108 articles in order to elimi nate sample bias from our intercoding reliability assessment Our intercoding reliability the level of agreement between the two coders reached over 92 per cent We start from an assumption that coding can give only an indication of key themes and cannot itself provide a full explanation Accordingly this study was 12 Zhang Diyu Zhongguo hexinliyi zhi bian The debate on Chinas core interests Shijie zhishi World affairs no 19 2011 p 20 13 Zeng Jinghan The debate on regime legitimacy in China bridging the wide gulf between western and Chinese scholarship Journal of Contemporary China 23 88 2014 pp 61235 14 Zeng Jinghan Zhong xifang hefaxing yanjiu dongtai Chinese and western studies on political legitimacy government report for the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau of the CCP Beijing 2014 15 eg Zeng The debate on regime legitimacy in China Bruce Gilley and Heike Holbig The debate on party legitimacy in China a mixed quantitativequalitative analysis Journal of Contemporary China 18 59 2009 pp 33958 Amy King Where does Japan fit in Chinas new type of great power relations Asan Forum 2 2 2014 Biwu Zhang Chinese perceptions of US return to Southeast Asia and the prospect of Chinas peace ful rise Journal of Contemporary China 24 91 2015 pp 17695 Biwu Zhang Chinese perceptions of the US an exploration of Chinas foreign policy motivations Lanham MD Lexington 2012 Tianbiao Zhu and Margaret Pearson Globalization and the role of the state reflections on Chinese international and comparative political economy scholarship Review of International Political Economy 20 6 2013 pp 121543 Zhongying Pang and Hongying Wang Debating international institutions and global governance the missing Chinese contribu tion Review of International Political Economy 20 6 2013 pp 1189214 16 By selecting articles with core interests in the title or keywords Articles which studied the core interests of certain sectors or other countries other than the national core interests of China were filtered out INTA912FullIssueindb 248 05032015 142931 Securing Chinas core interests 249 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs supported by interviews with some of the more influential authors identified by the coding results17 Understanding China and its foreign policies We noted above the widespread idea among western commentators that China seems to have become increasingly assertive with the growth of its national strength Within China it is argued that this view is misguided and that anything China says or does that does not conform to the status quo is immediately taken as a sign of a new activism This creates an inherent bias in interpreting China as long as China expresses its own independent views or holds different views from America it will be considered assertive18 It is also argued that some countries usually categorize China as a weak developing country when discussing Chinas rights and interests but consider China a developed major power when discussing Chinas responsibility This asymmetrical treatment reflects their selfishness and contradictions19 We found that 2037 per cent of our 108 articles argue that foreign countriesthe outside world have been discrediting China or its foreign policies For example the former Chinese Ambassador to Germany Mei Zhaorong argues that the EU has been using Taiwan and East Turkestan to attack and slander China20 The question that naturally follows is why Nearly 18 per cent 1759 per cent of the articles argue that the outside world misunderstands China But this misun derstanding is not seen as accidental rather it is seen as driven by interests As one researcher from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences CASS elaborates A fundamental reason why some foreigners argue that Chinas diplomacy has become more assertive is that this kind of argument fits their interests They attempted to use this argument to divert attention21 Another article argues that this assertiveness view is a revised version of the China threat theory and a part of American strategy to maintain its hegemony at a time when its power might otherwise be in decline and its natural allies turning away from the US towards multipolarity Thus these interests seek to discredit and distort western public opinion about developing countries such as China22 This article concluded that the international community needs to use a more peaceful state of mind to treat an increasingly powerful China Crucially there is a key shift here from the earlier debates over the China threat theory Previously the emphasis was on what China should do to try to 17 All data including our coding manual codebook online appendix and other materials are available at our research page httpssitesgooglecomsitezengjinghandata accessed 2 Feb 2015 18 Wang Fan and Ling Shengli Zhongguo de waijiao zhengce bian qiangying le ma Ruhe lijie zhongguo de xin waijiao Did Chinas foreign policy become more assertive How to understand Chinas new diplomacy Dangdai shijie Contemporary world no 3 2013 p 23 19 Wang and Ling Zhongguo de waijiao zhengce bian qiangying le ma p 23 20 Mei Zhaorong Dui zhongou guanxi de zai renshi A further understanding of ChinaEurope relations Ouzhou yanjiu European studies no 5 2009 p 20 21 Zhou Fangying Zhongguo waijiao ruan yu ying de biaozhun shi shenme What standards of Chinas diplo macy are soft and hard Renmin luntan Peoples forum no 4 2013 p 56 22 Wang and Ling Zhongguo de waijiao zhengce bian qiangying le ma p 24 INTA912FullIssueindb 249 05032015 142931 Jinghan Zeng Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin 250 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs assuage concerns in others and convince them of Chinas responsibility and its commitment to peace and stability As we will discuss in more detail shortly this argument retains considerable purchase today But importantly it is not just China that is now seen as needing to change to fit with the realities of the global order now the global order needs to change tooor more correctly key actors in that order need to changeto reflect the realities of a global order that contains an increasingly powerful China China is doing what it can to live with the world and now the rest of the world should learn how to better live with China23 As already noted relations with the United States loom large and just over a quarter of the articles 2592 per cent argue that the US has been containing China Many believe that the US manipulates key territorial integrity issues Taiwan Tibet and Xinjiangas part of a broader strategy of containing China or even of splitting it Almost all of these papers see the US strategy of repivoting towards Asia as having an antiChina agenda at its core A smaller set of scholars also point to Japan as a means to the end of Chinese containment while a few articles express different views24 Once more we see a diverse set of opinions and arguments While the antiUS sentiment is the dominant one in the literature there are also voices suggesting that the US has been using engagement instead of containment25 Some argue that rather than seeing the US as an obstacle to Chinas rise China should instead use the US to boost its rise26 Others argue more pragmatically that the US is simply not capable of containing China because it is impossible to isolate China economically in todays globalized world and to persuade other countries to join together to counter Chinas rise27 We should note though that the fault here is not seen as lying exclusively with external governments and that the blame for misunderstanding Chinese intentions is not ascribed exclusively to external perceptions Public opinion and nationalism within China are seen as forming one driver among several of Chinas foreign policy and this domestic sentiment helps influence external perceptions of China Somewhat ironically the problem as seen from China is not that China is being assertive but rather that it isnt being assertive enough In the debate 138 per cent of articles argue that Chinese society expects the government to take a tougher and less compromising line on foreign policy For example one article argues that some Chinese people considered the current Chinese diplomacy too weak A primary reason is that the Chinese government has lacked the courage and determination to use military power when dealing with territorial disputes in recent yearsunlike those tough 23 Wang and Ling Zhongguo de waijiao zhengce bian qiangying le ma p 26 24 eg Li Zeshi Hou jinrong weiji shidai zhongmei zhanlue huxin tantao Discussion on SinoUS strategic mutual trust in the era of postfinancial crisis Tequ jingji Special zone economy no 12 2011 pp 104106 Shen Dingli Xin zhongguo 60nian guoji diwei de bianhua 60 years of new China changes in international status Tansuo yu zhengming Exploration and debate no 12 2009 pp 235 Li Haidong Zhongmei guanxi 30 nian tedian yu qushi 30 years of SinoUS relations characteristics and trends Dangdai shijie Contem porary world no 1 2009 pp 2830 Liu Guanyu jin jinian zhongguo waijiao de fansi 25 H Li Zhongmei guanxi 30 nian p 30 26 Z Li Hou jinrong weiji shidai zhongmei zhanlue huxin tantao p 104 27 eg Liu Guanyu jin jinian zhongguo waijiao de fansi p 43 INTA912FullIssueindb 250 05032015 142931 Securing Chinas core interests 251 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs foreign policies pursued before reform and opening up when China did not hesitate to take military actions28 This tendency in public opinion can be attributed in part to the CCPs ruling strategy In recent decades the CCP has been using popular propaganda to dissem inate the discourse of national rejuvenation in order to gain popular support29 According to this partyled discourse it is the party and only the party that can defend Chinas core interests in a hostile international environment However a negative consequence of this strategy is that it contributes to the rise of Chinese nationalism One result has been a tendency in some quarters to take Chinas status as a global powerand increasingly as the number two global powerfor granted This in turn generates high expectations of what China can and should do in international affairsexpectations that some within Chinas International Relations IR community argue do not mesh with the reality of the distribution of power in the global order and Chinas place in it As a professor at Beijing University argued in China diplomacy is out of sync with domestic propaganda Chinas diplomacy is not only incompatible with domestic propaganda but is also kidnapped by the latter In the end when facing various complicated foreign affairs domestic public opinion is seriously out of line with the reality of diplomacy30 The resulting suggestion in the debate is that the Chinese government needs to control the negative impacts of nationalism on diplomacy31 For example one article argues that China should prevent nationalist sentiment or certain histor ical understandings from challenging the rational national security strategy32 This refers to the way in which patriotic education by the state has helped shape a nationalism that is strongly influenced by and rooted in the Century of Humiliation33 Dominant historical narratives point to the role that foreign intervention and western and Japanese imperialism played in weakening China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries34 This weak China was unable to defend its core interests and defend its territorial integrity in the face of foreign determination to subordinate and subjugate it Only with the rise of the CCP was the tide turned and Chinas territorial integrity slowly restoredand even now this process is not yet complete It is this story so the argument goes that is at 28 Liang Yunxiang Waijiao ruanying yulun fancha de shenceng jiexi An indepth analysis of public opinions on diplomacy Renmin luntan Peoples forum no 4 2013 p 59 29 Zeng Jinghan The survival of the Chinese Communist Party evaluating ideology legitimacy and party cohesion Basing stoke Palgrave Macmillan forthcoming 2015 30 Zhu Feng Weihu hexinliyi jidai waijiao da zhanlue To protect Chinas core interests needs a diplomatic grand strategy Renming luntan Peoples forum no s1 2012 p 31 31 eg Xiao Xi Dongbeiya anquan zouxiang yu zhongguo zhanlue tiaozheng On the trend of security in NorthEast Asia and adjustment of Chinas strategies Jiaoxue yu yanjiu Teaching and research no 7 2011 p 79 Xuedong Yang Zhong mei pingdeng guanxi de gengduo xinyi More new ideas in the equal SinoUS relations Tenmin luntan Peoples forum no 274 2009 p 34 32 Xiao Dongbeiya anquan zouxiang yu zhongguo zhanlue tiaozheng p 79 33 He Yinan History Chinese nationalism and the emerging SinoJapanese conflict Journal of Contemporary China 50 16 2007 pp 124 34 While not ignoring the role that was also played by oppressive corrupt and ideologically bankrupt domestic leaders INTA912FullIssueindb 251 05032015 142931 Jinghan Zeng Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin 252 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs the root of some of the demand for a more assertive China What is needed now is a shift in approach to cultivate healthy historical views built on a great power mentality rather than a victim discourse35 From this perspective negotiation and compromise are not automatically seen as negative and weak and some leeway is allowed for diplomacy There is also a conflicting school that sees nationalism as having positive conse quences for international affairs For example a Japan expert based at CASS argues that China should gradually get used to negotiating the issues of the Diaoyu Islands with Japan in public environmentsie publish detailed meeting minutes after every negotiation In this way Chinas foreign policy towards Japan will certainly win more and more public understanding and support Only under public scrutiny and through paying attention to changing public opinion can this kind of negotiation succeed This is what peoples diplo macy should do36 Who informs the debate An analysis of the home institutions of the authors of this body of articles reveals the significance of stateaffiliated thinktanks in Chinese academic discourse University academics account for less than half of the total 4166 per cent a third come from thinktanks including 148 per cent from CASS and 555 per cent from the Central and Shanghai Party Schools Just over 5 per cent of articles were written by government officials and former diplomats including three frequently cited and prominent commentators on Chinas international relations Ma Zhengang former Chinese Ambassador to the UK Mei Zhaorong former Ambassador to Germany and Shen Guofang former Assistant Foreign Minister and Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the UN While previous work on legitimacy revealed a nationwide spread of authors37 the overwhelming majority in this study were located in Beijing 5648 per cent While this may in part simply reflect the location of Chinas major thinktanks and IRfocused universities it might also reflect a more Beijingcentric IR debate in contrast to the focus on local government and local governance in legitimacy discourses One striking result of a previous study on the nature of regime legitimacy in China and challenges to it was the extent to which the debate was informed by the writings of western political scientists and philosophers Here the top ten cited authors were all western writers Max Weber cited in 49 per cent of papers Jürgen Habermas 40 per cent Samuel Huntington 39 per cent Seymour Lipset 39 per cent Karl Marx 33 per cent Gabriel Almond 33 per cent JeanJacques Rousseau 28 per cent David Easton 24 per cent JeanMarc Coicaud 23 per 35 Wang Junsheng Zhanlue huanjing de bianqian yu guojia liyi de jieding zhongguo guoji jiaose de siwei gexin Changes in strategic environment and definition of national interests innovative thinking of Chinas role in international affairs Jiaoxue yu yanjiu Teaching and research no 3 2011 p 74 36 Jiang Lifeng Diaoyudao wenti yu zhongri guanxi Diaoyu Islands and SinoJapanese relations Riben xuekan Japanese studies no 5 2012 p 14 37 Zeng The debate on regime legitimacy in China INTA912FullIssueindb 252 05032015 142931 Securing Chinas core interests 253 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs cent and Aristotle 19 per cent38 We were told by Chinese scholars that the influence of western scholars remains dominant in Chinese academic writing on politics39 Furthermore given the often sensitive nature of debates over domestic political issues Chinese authors are somewhat reluctant to engage in debates with their peers on andor to be critical of official state policy But when it comes to debating Chinas core interests the results are totally different Some western scholars are indeed cited Alastair Johnston John Mearsheimer David Shambaugh Avery Goldstein Michael Swaine Robert Ross and Shaun Breslin among others However none of them is cited by more than three articles and overall they have much less influence than the western political scientists who inform the legitimacy debate Notably John Mearsheimer whose works have been translated into Chinese and whose views on the inevitable clash of a rising China with the existing hegemon are widely discussed in China is referred to in only two papers The most influential western scholar in this debate is probably the fifteenthsixteenthcentury Niccolò Machiavelli whose The Prince is often taken as the source of the concept national interests40 Henry Kissinger is also a relatively familiar figure in the debates but more as a diplomat than a scholar with focus on his role in developing SinoUS relations in the 1970s However at best there is minimal engagement with external studies and the mostcited scholars are all Chinesethough none of the cited authors have anywhere near the same dominance and influence as any of the top ten scholars in the legitimacy debate Looking more widely beyond the specific debate over core interests we suggest that the Chinese IR community is much more comfortable with citing and engaging with each other in their publications and promoting different and conflicting ideas Returning to the debate over core interests Yan Xuetong the dean of Tsinghua Qinghua Universitys Institute of Inter national Relations and the editor of The Chinese Journal of International Politics is without doubt the most cited scholar 83 per cent Yans 1996 book Analysis of Chinas national interests has become something of a benchmark for subsequent research breaking away from the definition of national interest in narrow terms for example the indivisibility of Taiwan from China and promoting the evolu tion of new thinking with new definitions and categories of national interest41 Other frequently cited scholars include Wang Yizhou Wang Jisi and Niu Xinchun Niu Xinchun a researcher based at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations a thinktank related to the Ministry of State Security is one of the few oftencited authors who is also an active writer on this topic two of his articles are included in our database Other less prominently cited scholars include Tang Shiping and Qin Yaqing Luo Yuan a retired army majorgeneral and active political commentator known for promoting a strong nationalist and at times strongly antiAmerican line was also mentioned by four articles 38 Zeng The debate on regime legitimacy in China p 618 39 Zeng The debate on regime legitimacy in China p 618 40 eg Liang Yunxiang Hexin liyi meiri jiaoxun yu zhongguo lujin Core interests the lessons from America and Japan and the Chinese path Renmin luntan Peoples forum no 9 2012 pp 289 41 Zhang Zhongguo hexinliyi zhi bian p 19 INTA912FullIssueindb 253 05032015 142931 Jinghan Zeng Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin 254 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs Which theories inform the debate Mearsheimers absence from the debate may seem all the more surprising given that realism is the IR theory most often referred to for explanatory theoretical purposes It is also noteworthy that the realist scholar Yan Xuetong is the most cited author We also find some critics of realism though and there is certainly no single Chinese theoretical realist position For example one article argues that American strategic misunderstandings of China are partly caused by realist views for example Chinas active development of its relations with African countries is considered by the United States as socalled neocolonialism and Chinas cooperation with Myanmar Venezuela Sudan among others is inter preted as irresponsible and amounting to support for antiUS forces42 The theoretical element of the debate of course is not confined to IR theory Varieties of Marxism are referred to by 1296 per cent of the articlesMarxism itself by 1296 per cent Engelism by 648 per cent and Leninism by 648 per cent43 We should note though that the overwhelming majority of these papers refer to Marxism in the course of explaining what Chinas core interests are ie socialist ideology and the socialist political economypolitical system rather than while explaining the nature of international relations and the global order Some argue that China should develop its own IR theories so that it can create a discourse system in its favour rather than relying on western theories The basic argument here is that the dominant theories have been developed in the West by examining western historical experiences and under the influence of western individualistic philosophical trends They claim to be international and by extension universal but in reality cannot explain or predict the behav iour of nonwestern countries like China that have very different philosophical cultural and historical contexts Hence the importance of developing an indig enous national security view that is generated from ancient Chinese strategic thinking on national security rather than just importing inappropriate western concepts44 The same basic thinking about the relationship between western theory and Chinese experience can lead to a subtly different position which we can explore by turning back to the debate over core interests The term itself is typically seen to have travelled to China from the West and a number of authors take western understandings as their starting point for defining what Chinas core interests are or should be Just over 12 per cent 123 per cent of articles discuss how other countries including the United States the United Kingdom Singapore Japan and the former Soviet Union identifyidentified and protectprotected their core interests How the United States in particular has been identifying and protecting 42 Niu Changzhen and Xu Gang Zhanlue huxin yu zhongmei guanxi Strategic mutual trust and SinoUS relations Guoji luntan International forum 12 3 2010 p 14 43 The overall figure is adjusted to avoid double counting where a paper refers to more than one type of Marxist thinking 44 For examples of Chinese security concepts see Yin Chaohui Zhongguo gudai guojia anquan zhanlue sixiang de jiejian jiazhi Reference value of Chinese ancient strategic thinking on national security Lilun yu tansuo Theoretical exploration no 5 2013 pp 647 INTA912FullIssueindb 254 05032015 142931 Securing Chinas core interests 255 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs its core interests is a major source of reference for Chinese intellectuals seeking to elaborate their views on Chinas core interests Using American categorizations of national interests as examples45 many argue that China should also disaggregate its national interests into several categories in order to define core interests more clearly46 But as with other terms that have come in from the outside it is not enough just to import them unaltered from the sources Just as Mao argued that MarxismLeninism should be viewed as a set of guiding principles that needed to be indigenized to reflect the specifics of the contemporary Chinese context so today western theories need to be modified to make them appropriate for China Hence the ubiquity of the suffix in Chinese a prefixyou zhongguo tese de with Chinese characteristics to indigenize a whole range of concepts that have come into China from foreign discourses In total only 46 per cent of articles refer to Chinese IR theories as an explana tory tool The most common form of indigenous thinking is not a new theory but a relatively old one While Mao Zedongs theory of the three worlds might not be an IR theory as such in the way that for example liberalism or realism is it is often treated as one in Chinese discourse47 For example a professor based at the CPS Gong Li argues that contemporary Chinese diplomatic theoriesincluding the views of international cooper ation that advances with the times concepts of national interests that balance interests with justice active international system views the overall comprehensive vision and peopleoriented diplomatic values among othersare all derived from Mao Zedongs three worlds theory48 By comparison a quarter of the articles refer to Chinese culture and philos ophy as playing an important and often dominant role in the creation of Chinese discourses of core interests interests with Chinese characteristics Here there is an emphasis on distinctly Chinese historical and cultural traditions that empha size harmony which have become embedded in Chinas contemporary peaceful development philosophy and strategy49 The roots of how China conceives of its core interests are thus found in one Chinaan ancient Chinese national security 45 eg Robert Ellsworth Andrew Goodpaster and Rita Hauser Americas national interests a report from the Commission on Americas National Interests Washington DC 2000 46 eg Zhao Yi Ba zhongguo de hexinliyi jieding de geng qingxi zhunque To define Chinas core interests more clearly and accurately Shijie zhishi World affairs no 14 2011 p 65 Niu Xinchun Zhongguo zai zhongdong de liyi yu yingxiangli fenxi Analyse Chinas interests and influence in the Middle East Xiandai guoji guanxi Contemporary international relations no 10 2013 p 47 Wang Gonglong Guojia hexinliyi jiqi jieding Core national interests and their definition Shanghai xingzheng xueyuan xuebao Journal of Shanghai Administration Institute 12 6 2011 p 77 47 Whether the theory is really Maos or perhaps owes more to others such as Zhou Enlai may be debatable but in these debates the theory is firmly associated with Mao See eg Gong Li Sange shijie huafen lilun dui dangdai zhongguo de shenyuan yingxiang Three world theorys profound impacts on contemporary China Zhongguo shehui kexue Chinas social science no 8 2012 pp 2430 Zhang Zhongguo hexinliyi zhibian Xing Hua Zhong ou guanxi de kuayueshi fazhan Leapfrog development of ChinaEU relations Guoji wenti yanjiu International affairs studies no 1 2010 pp 1015 48 Gong Sange shijie huafen lilun dui dangdai zhongguo de shenyuan yingxiang p 29 49 Gong Li Zou heping fazhan daolu yu guojia hexinliyi de weihu Peaceful development and the maintenance of national core interests Dangdai shijie yu shehui zhuyi Contemporary world and socialism no 5 2013 pp 11013 INTA912FullIssueindb 255 05032015 142931 Jinghan Zeng Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin 256 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs philosophy that has lasted for thousands of years50 As using western political theories to explain the socalled national core interests can very easily mislead public opinion51 there is a need to be flexible and create a form of core interests with Chinese characteristics that is more inwardlooking focusing on Chinas own cultural traditions In most of the literature arguing for both a Chinese theory and the impor tance of Chinese characteristics the emphasis is rather defensive on being able to explain why predictions that China will not and cannot rise peacefully are wrong But we also found a more proactive if not offensive position emerging as well For example one article argues that The rising China should export philosophies and ideas to the field of international relations disseminate the ethics of Chinese international relations build the image of Confucius and establish ethical standards of international relations and international politics that are based on Chinese philosophies In this way it will help to enhance Chinas discursive power in the field of international relations52 Ultimately though arguably the most striking conclusion of our analysis is the overall lack of theoretical engagement in the literature Although realism is the most commonly cited theory it is referred to only in 1388 per cent of articles If we add in liberalism and idealism in 833 per cent and 463 per cent of papers respectively neoliberalism 277 per cent and constructivism 092 per cent and then discount for double counting ie papers that refer to more than one theory only 2037 per cent of all papers refer to the mainstream IR theories Or to put it another way almost fourfifths of the papers did not refer to IR theory at all Moreover we explicitly use the word refer here as a number of the papers simply refer to realism andor liberalism as theoretical schools without elucidating a preference for one over the other as the most effective explanatory theory Finally we note that when realism is invoked as an explanatory theory it is typically to explain the behaviour of others even more typically of the United States rather than to understand Chinese actions and intentions Writing on Chinese analyses of the international political economy of global ization Zhu and Pearson argue that the literature in general is not oriented to theorybuilding which makes it impossible to conclude that there is a Chinese school of thought on this topic Instead the scholarship is largely policydriven there is a strong impulsereflected even in the standard format of articlesto provide positive policy advice to Chinese policymakers53 However in the same issue of Review of International Political Economy Pang and Wang find that when it comes to the study of international institutions and global governance foreign scholarship plays a role and many authors cite relevant western theories54 Clearly 50 Yin Zhongguo gudai guojia anquan zhanlue sixiang de jiejian jiazhi p 65 51 Yang Mian Pingheng zhongguo waijiao de gangxing yu rouxing To balance the rigidity and flexibility of Chinas diplomacy Shijie zhishi World affairs no 5 2011 p 44 52 Yang Pingheng zhongguo waijiao de gangxing yu rouxing p 44 53 Zhu and Pearson Globalization and the role of the state p 1216 54 Pang and Wang Debating international institutions and global governance the missing Chinese contribu tion INTA912FullIssueindb 256 05032015 142931 Securing Chinas core interests 257 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs our findings chime more with the conclusions of the former than the latter Rather than being driven by theoretical concerns the literature is dominated by two other issues first the reactive nature of scholarship to specific events and second the importance of key leaders in establishing political agendas that in turn generate new academic agendas Eventdriven scholarship The dominant themes in the literature are Chinas security and territorial disputes currency and financial security energy security and Chinas politicalideological system The specific lens through which these issue areas are discussed changes in close association with events For example all four articles that place the EU as the challenger to Chinas core interests appeared in 200910 after French President Nicolas Sarkozy met the Dalai Lama in December 200855 As France held the rotating presidency of the EU at the time this was taken as a European rather than simply national interference in Chinese sovereign affairs that seriously challenged Chinas core interests of which more shortly56 After 2009 the focus of attention shifted to SinoUS affairs which is by far the single most debated relationship dealt with in 3148 per cent of papers By 2011 another new shift could be discerned as debates began to focus on territorial disputes in the South China Sea and over the DiaoyuSenkaku Islands Here we note a subtle but important difference between concern about others interfering in issues that they have no right to try to influence internal Chinese politics in Tibet and Xinjiang and more fundamental questions about the nature of Chinese territorial claimswhat the national territory is or should be that China has the right to protect and defend Taiwan has typically been treated in the first category but can fall into the second type of debate as well It is in the desire to ensure that Chinas own definition of its territory is accepted by others that we see the source of an increasing number of assertions of the need for China to define its core interests more clearly and to change its grand strategy in order to better protect them Not surprisingly this shift in emphasis was also reflected in a change in geographical interest away from bilateral relations with the United States and Europe to regional issues in Chinas own backyard Over 20 per cent of the papers published between 2011 and 2013 had a specific regional focus57 However as Zhang notes when Chinese academics discuss SouthEast Asia the role of the United States in the region and what this means for China is never far below the surface either implicitly or explicitly58 55 China had already cancelled a planned EUChina summit a month earlier to protest at Sarkozys plan to meet the Dalai Lama 56 eg Mei Dui zhongou guanxi de zai renshi 57 Using the terms East Asia SouthEast Asia Pacific Asia or Chinas periphery 58 Zhang Chinese perceptions of US return to Southeast Asia and the prospect of Chinas peaceful rise INTA912FullIssueindb 257 05032015 142931 Jinghan Zeng Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin 258 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs Which leaders visions matter Given that the debates are heavily influenced by events it is perhaps not surprising that they are also strongly shaped by the views and statements of top leaders 59 Hu Jintao was party leader from 2002 to 2012 and thus for almost all of our census period 200813 His words and opinions are cited in 2962 per cent of articles But this proportion is exceeded by Xi Jinpingwho is perceived to have taken a tougher position on the issue of core interests than his predecessors even though he was only Chinas top leader for just over a year within our census period his discourse on core interests quoted at the beginning of this article is cited by 3333 per cent of all papers published in 2013 In addition 1904 per cent of articles published that year mentioned Xis ideological slogan the China dreama still rather poorly developed concept built around the notion of Chinas national rejuvenation For example an article published in Red Flag Articles argues that the China dream opens a new page of Chinas national defence strategy and that China should develop a powerful military defence system in order to protect its core interests60 We also find a view emerging in recent years that China should adopt a new grand strategy in order to better protect its core interests In Hu Jintaos era Chinas grand strategy mainly followed Deng Xiaopings vision of taoguang yanghui typically translated as keeping a low profile implying that China should avoid taking international responsibilities and develop quietly Arguably the single most important debate in Chinese international relations since about 2009 is whether it is now time to abandon this position and take a new and more proactive global role designed to protect Chinas core interests and increase its influence on global politics61 There is general agreement that China has priori tized shortterm economic interests designed to facilitate its development goals over longerterm more broadly defined national security interests As a CASS researcher puts it China is racing against time and trading space for time It has sacrificed parts of its security interests in exchange for the period of strategic opportunities62 This strategy is seen as having been largely successful in helping to get China where it is today as a Great Power For Yan Xuetong keeping a low profile was highly appropriate when China still lacked economic prosperity But as China has become much more wealthy the exclusive pursuit of economic wealth has no longer matched Chinas national interests and the time is ripe for China to take a greater international role including taking on more international 59 In addition to the top leaders we also noted the importance of senior Chinese officials in the debate The former state councillor Dai Bingguo is mentioned by 855 of articlespartly because his discourse on Chinas core interests had been the most authoritative one before the 2011 White Paper was published In addition 46 articles mentioned Yang Jiechi the current state councillor in charge of foreign affairs 60 Yang Da Zhongguo meng kaiqi heping fazhan de guofang zhanlue China dream opens the national defence strategy of peaceful development Hongqi wengao Red flag articles no 22 2013 p 15 61 Hu Jian Cong taoguangyanghui dao jiji zuowei zhongguo waijiao siwen zhanlue yu ceyue de zhuanbian zoulun From taoguang yanghui to active conduct the transformation of Chinas diplomatic thinking strat egy and tactics Lilun daokan Theoretical guide no 4 2012 pp 107109 62 J Wang Zhanlue huanjing de bianqian yu guojia liyi de jieding zhongguo guoji jiaose de siwei gexin p 74 INTA912FullIssueindb 258 05032015 142931 Securing Chinas core interests 259 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs responsibilities63 This idea is elaborated in a recent article by Yan which argues that China should adopt striving for achievement as its new grand strategyand indeed that it already has since the assumption of power by Xi Jinping64 Yans view does not reflect a new consensus and is criticized by some For example one professor in the CPS argues that China is still underdeveloped and thus development rather than security remains its highest priority65 To many Chinese the current international environment is a period of strategic opportu nities for the rise of China in which China should focus on economic develop ment and keep quiet And notwithstanding Yans high profile we still find that a quarter of all articles mention Deng Xiaoping the original architect of the low profile strategy As we will discuss later these two contrary views on the fundamentals of Chinas grand strategy are partly based on their different evaluations of how the countrys core interests should be understood and how secure they are To what extent China will change its grand strategy is still far from clear What we can say with certainty is that there is a vigorous debate over the costs and benefits of the keeping a low profile strategy Considering the significance of this potential paradigm shift we plan to conduct a future study on how this reevaluation of the level of security of Chinas core interests may change Chinas grand strategy What are Chinas core interests What exactly are Chinas core interests The concept of core interests is a vague one open to interpretation in the Chinese discourseeven after the release of the 2011 White Paper A majority of articles discuss Chinas core interests only implic itly just 231 per cent of articles clearly define what Chinas core interests are Most of these take a line consistent with the official tone evolving over time as the official discourse changes Before 2011 many articles referred to Dai Bingguos definition of Chinas core interests to maintain Chinas fundamental system and state security state sovereignty and territorial integrity and the continued stable development of the economy and society66 After 2011 the standard was the White Paper released that September 314 per cent of subsequent articles refer to Chinas core interests as defined by the White Paper Although academic views did not contradict the official line the official line itself is not particularly precisely drawn allowing considerable leeway for inter pretation For example there is no consensus over whether Chinas core interests can include some that lie outside the country Some argue that all Chinas core interests are domestic issues that China is an inwardlooking country whose 63 Fan Qinghua Zhongmei guanxi ruhe caineng jiankang fazhan SinoUS relations how to develop health ily Shijie zhishi World affairs no 5 2011 p 26 64 Yan Xuetong From keeping a low profile to striving for achievement Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 2 2014 pp 15384 65 J Liu Guanyu jin jinian zhongguo waijiao de fansi p 40 66 Dai Bingguo Dai Bingguo the core interests of the Peoples Republic of China 7 Aug 2009 httpchina digitaltimesnet200908daibingguoE688B4E7A789E59BBDthecoreinterestsofthe prc accessed 1 Feb 2015 INTA912FullIssueindb 259 05032015 142931 Jinghan Zeng Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin 260 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs culture traditions and philosophy determine that all of its core interests are within China67 Others argue that Chinas core interests have to go beyond a simple sovereign territorial constraint The White Paper includes the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development as a core interest So for Niu Xinchun energy interests in the Middle East simply must be part of Chinas core interests because Middle East energy will materially affect Chinas sustainable growth68 Another article written by Li Zhongjie a deputy director of the Party History Research Centre and Li Bing a deputy director in the CCPs Department of Organization argues that what he terms international strategic access guoji zhanlue tongdao involves Chinas core interests because it relates to international trade security and sovereignty69 Specifically they consider the first island chain as a key element in US and Japanese strategic plans to contain China and argue that to recover Taiwan is the key to break the first island chain and thus to solve all of Chinas strategic dilemma on maritime security70 Thus they conclude that China should develop and enhance its navy in order to prepare for military actions to recover Taiwan and to protect Chinese islands resources and offshore transport routes71 Of course we should note here that what is considered an internal domestic Chinese issue in Chinese debate may include territories that others might think are not Chinese at all Crucially though if they are deemed by China to be in China then there is no leeway for any discussion or negotiation with others territorial integrity is a bottomline nonnegotiable interest The position of Taiwan Tibet and Xinjiang as inalienable and integral parts of China is taken for granted and not open for discussion So when they are considered in the debate in 2407 per cent 1574 per cent and 83 per cent of papers respectively the main focus is on foreign governments policiesespecially US policytowards those regions more so even than on the potential separatist policies promoted by restive forces in these regions themselves It is argued that the policies of certain foreign govern ments have seriously challenged Chinas core interests Sometimes the referent is ethnicity rather than territory but here too the focus is on why only China can deal with and even in some discourses talk about Chinas ethnic affairs and on attempts by overseas antiChinese forces to use ethnic affairs to split China72 A much smaller group of writers argue that the South China Sea is a core inter est For example a professor in the Shanghai Party School argues that the group of South China Sea islands definitely belongs to Chinas core interests because 67 Chu Shulong and Ying Chen Dui zhongmei guanxi de lixing kaoliang yu zhanwang Rational thoughts and the prospect of SinoUS relations Dangdai shijie yu shehui zhuyi Contemporary world and socialism no 4 2012 p 27 68 Niu Zhongguo zai zhongdong de liyi yu yingxiangli fenxi p 47 69 This refers to the free passage of goods and resources across international borders and through major sea lanes of communication Li Zhongjie and Li Bing Zhuanjin zhiding zhongguo zai guoji zhanlue tongdao wenti shang de zhanlue duice Pay close attention to making Chinas strategy to respond to international strategic passage Dangdai shijie yu shehui zhuyi Contemporary world and socialism no 5 2011 pp 108 109 70 Z Li and B Li Zhuanjin zhiding zhongguo zai guoji zhanlue tongdao wenti shang de zhanlue duice p 110 71 Z Li and B Li Zhuanjin zhiding zhongguo zai guoji zhanlue tongdao wenti shang de zhanlue duice p 112 72 eg Yu Zidong Lun minzu wenti yu zhongguo hexinliyi de xiangguanxi Discuss the relevance of ethnic affairs and Chinas core interests Renmin luntan Peoples forum no 350 2011 pp 425 INTA912FullIssueindb 260 05032015 142931 Securing Chinas core interests 261 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs it relates to Chinas national survival security and development Even if China does not have sufficient ability to control them it is objectively an integral part of Chinas core interests73 Another disputed area the DiaoyuSenkaku Islands is also considered a core interest in a couple of articles One article argues that the Diaoyu Islands have always been Chinas territory and thus concern Chinas core intereststhat it should never allow others to infringe In this regard there is nothing to negotiate with Japan This authors policy recommendation is that any future negotiation between China and Japan should primarily focus on how Japan should completely return Diaoyu Islands to China74 However we should note that a mere 37 per cent of papers refer to the South China Sea islands as constitut ing a core interest and only 185 per cent refer to the Diaoyu Islands in this way A smaller group of scholars 185 per cent of articles extend the range of Chinas core interests to the Korean peninsula For example Niu Xinchun argues that the stability and development of the Korean peninsula directly relate to Chinas core interests75 A more explicit and ambitious view is held by a professor at Jilin University Xiao Xi who argued in an article funded by two governmental projects that regional leadership in NorthEast Asia is among Chinas core inter ests More specifically Xiao argues that Chinas core interests in NorthEast Asia are reflected in ensuring that dominance in the NorthEast Asia region does not fall into the hands of any other major power denuclearization regional stability trade and economic cooperation the Diaoyu Islands and Taiwan76 She also argues that China should use bilateral and multilateral free trade to promote a free trade zone in NorthEast Asia and thus provide an institutionalized basis for Chinas dominant position in the region77 Ideology and the political system are also mentioned by some as core interests It is argued that the infiltration of western political values has seriously threat ened Chinas socialist ideology and political system and thus Chinas core interests Thus we must emphasize the struggle for values in order to prevent national core interests from being violated78 Other core interests specifically identified in the debate include along with ideology and the political system ensuring economic growth human rights the political system ideology environmental issues the development of socialism and Chinas modernization However they are perhaps surprisingly very much minor issues none of these is mentioned in more than four articles Only seven articles clearly identify what they consider the most important core interest to be National sovereignty and national security are considered by two and one articles respectively as the most important core interests By comparison 73 G Wang Guojia hexinliyi jiqi jieding p 80 74 Jiang Diaoyudao wenti yu zhongri guanxi p 48 75 Niu Xinchun Zhongmei zhanlue huxin gainian wenti ji tiaozhan The strategic mutual trust between China and the US concepts issues and challenges Xiandai guoji guanxi Contemporary international rela tions no 3 2010 p 4 76 Xiao Dongbeiya anquan zouxiang yu zhongguo zhanlue tiaozheng p 76 77 Xiao Dongbeiya anquan zouxiang yu zhongguo zhanlue tiaozheng p 79 78 Chen Yanbin and Zhou Bin Guowai jiazhiguan de ninglian jiqi qishi The summary of foreign values and its implications Makesizhuyi yanjiu Marxism studies no 10 2012 p 142 INTA912FullIssueindb 261 05032015 142931 Jinghan Zeng Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin 262 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs five articles argue that the specific issue of Taiwan is Chinas most important core interest Collectively the biggest threat to Chinas core interests is seen as coming from attempts to destroy Chinas territorial integrity This includes a focus on separatist forces in Taiwan 2037 per cent Tibet 1111 per cent and Xinjiang 833 per cent separatism more broadly 1111 per cent disputes in the South China 1018 per cent and East China 83 per cent seas and the potential conse quences of Japanese militarism 277 per cent Related issues such as generic and nonethnicspecific terrorism 185 per cent and ideological threats 56 per cent are discussed less often By far the biggest problem for China in respect of protecting its core interests is the United States Taiwan is not only important in itself for China it is also considered to be the biggest problem in SinoUS relations Moreover the US is blamed for trying to sabotage this most important core interest For example one article argues that regarding the issue of the most central and important interest Taiwan the US has always been interfering challenging and damaging Chinas core interests79 In total 1481 per cent of papers refer to US policy towards China on a range of other issues especially Xinjiang Tibet and human rights policies as threatening Chinas core interests It is argued that the US has never cared about Chinas core interests For example one article argues The US has never had any scruples respecting Chinas core interests the more important the issues are concerned with Chinas national core interests the more likely that the US will challenge them80 In two articles Chu Shulong a professor at Tsinghua University goes a step further and argues that the core interests of the US and China cannot be resolved because they are oppositional81 It is argued that the core interests of the US and China are opposite and confrontational this funda mentally determines that SinoUS relations cannot be friendlyit may even be an opposing and confrontational relationship82 This view echoes the prediction of Great Power conflict theory that the core interests of the rising power and the existing hegemon will eventually clashthough without directly engaging with the extant western literature on the theme There is then a tendency to treat tensions in USChinese relations as an unfor tunate but natural fact of life in a changing world order As one article puts it It is not easy to ask the US to give up its hegemonic attitude and actions and it is impossible to ask China to continue to tolerate the US actions that damaged Chinas core interests So a struggle is inevitable83 79 Chu Shulong and Fang Liwei Zhongmei guanxi de changqi zoushi Longterm trend of SinoUS relations Xiandai guoji guanxi Contemporary international relations no 6 2010 p 22 80 Bian Qingzu Dui 2010 nian zhongmei liangguo boyi de sikao A reflection on ChinaUS gamesmanship in 2010 Heping he fazhan Peace and development no 2 2011 p 21 81 Chu and Ying Dui zhongmeiguanxi de lixing kaoliang yu zhanwang p 27 Chu and Fang Zhongmei guanxi de changqi zoushi 82 Chu and Fang Zhongmei guanxi de changqi zoushi p 22 83 Dong Feng Zhongmei junshi guanxi jiujing zenme le What is wrong with USChina military relations Shijie zhishi World affairs no 13 2010 p 42 INTA912FullIssueindb 262 05032015 142931 Securing Chinas core interests 263 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs Core interests under threat Chinese intellectuals have very different evaluations of the level of insecurity of Chinas core interests which in turn result in very different policy recommenda tions A fifth of articles 2037 per cent use the words challenged or damaged weihai sunhai or tiaozhan in the course of reaching the conclusion that China should abandon its keeping a low profile strategy For example Zhu Feng a professor at Beijing University argues that Chinas core interests have faced unprecedented challenges since the Cold War If sover eignty political system security development and domestic stability constitute Chinas core interests then in this day and age Chinas core interests have been suffering from unprecedented significant challenges in the past 20 years84 Zhu concludes by arguing that China needs a new grand strategy in order to protect its core interestsa position that echoes Yan Xuetongs striving for achievement strategy mentioned above By contrast others argue that none of Chinas core interests face problems and thus that the country should not change its grand strategy For example a professor at the CPS argues that If we make a careful assessment these six core interests defined by the 2011 White Paper are not under threat Although the disputes in the South China Sea concern territory and sovereignty it is not the same thing as territorial integrity and national sovereignty being under threat Moreover this problem has already existed for a long time In the past 30 years if China did not abandon development as its first priority because of the South China Sea why should we change the approach now85 A third middleway view suggests that only some of Chinas core interests face problems For example a professor at Beijing University Liang Yunxiang argues that there are no big problems for Chinas national sovereignty and security but there are some prominent problems in terms of territorial integrity and national unity86 Concerned countries We noted above the focus on the United States as the major threat to Chinas core interests This focus becomes even more pronounced when we expand the analysis to include challenges to Chinas more broadly defined national interests over half the articles 564 per cent see the US as damaging Chinas national interests Other frequently mentioned challenger countries include Japan 1666 per cent Vietnam 83 per cent and the Philippines 74 per cent Most of these articles discuss Chinas territorial disputes with countries which are typically referred to as unreasonable troublemakers It is argued that these countries have been taking 84 Zhu Weihu hexinliyi jidai waijiao dazhanlue p 30 85 J Liu Guanyu jin jinian zhongguo waijiao de fansi p 41 86 Liang Hexin liyi meiri jiaoxun yu zhongguo lujin p 29 INTA912FullIssueindb 263 05032015 142931 Jinghan Zeng Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin 264 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs the American strategy of returning to Asia as an opportunity to muddy the waters in order to obtain more benefits when negotiating with China87 Interestingly we also find three articles implicitly blaming North Korea a semi ally of China for damaging Chinas interests The first focuses on Chinas direct disputes with North Korea on issues of oil gas and fisheries while the second considers a more indirect threat generated by North Koreas nuclear programme The third also looks at an indirect threat arguing that as long as North Korea is the cause of uncertainty and instability the United States will use it as a means of putting pressure on China88 Nonetheless as a CASS researcher points out there is a difference between countries causing problems on the one hand and being considered as enemies on the other In fact China does not have a real enemy China still has much strategic and tactical space for operations Thus China should not block that space and make enemies when there is a conflict89 Indeed despite the largely negative image of the United States in the articles we surveyed there is a recognition that it might also be a force for good with 1111 per cent of articles arguing that the US may help or has already helped China to protect its interestsmost notably in respect of mediating Chinese territorial sovereignty issues relating to Taiwan90 and the DiaoyuSenkaku Islands91 One article even argues that Japan can work with China to secure Chinese interests in and over Taiwan92 Noticeably none of these articles argues that Russia has damaged or is a threat to Chinas interests93 In other words the image of Russia in the Chinese discourse is almost entirely positive We find that 55 per cent of articles argue that Russia will help or has helped China to protect its interests some consider the Sino Russian relationship to be one of the most important bilateral relationships94 and note that the two countries share a similar position in the global order and a similar worldview As a director of the China Institute of International Studies points out For a long time China and Russia have been discriminated against by the West to varying degrees The establishment of a SinoRussian strategic 87 eg Li Xiangyang Zhongguo jueqi guochengzhong jiejue bianhai wenti de chulu Solutions of maritime territory during the rise of China Xiandai guoji guanxi Contemporary international relations no 8 2012 p 18 88 Guo Changlin Mei zhanlue zhongxin dongyi hou de zhongguo zhoubian anquan huanjing Chinas periph eral security after the US conducted the eastward shift of its strategic centre of gravity Xiandai guoji guanxi Contemporary international relations no 10 2013 p 16 89 Zhang Yunling Xianshi waijiao buneng jinping ganqing yongshi xinxing daguo yao neng naozhu xingzi Realistic diplomacy should not depend on emotions emerging power should live with temper Renmin luntan Peoples forum no 12 2013 p 55 90 eg Ding Yuan Guojia hexinliyi yu yatai xiaoguo waijiao zhanlue yanjiu National core interests and Asia Pacific small countries diplomatic strategic studies Dongnan daxue xuebao zhexue shehui kexueban Journal of Southeast University philosophy and social science no 15 2013 p 174 91 eg Li Shuzhen Cong diaoyudao zhengduan kan zhongmeiri daguo zhanlue de jiaoliang he boyi From the disputes in Diaoyu Islands to study China US and Japans strategic game and contest Sixiang jiaoyu lilun daokan Leading journal of ideological and theoretical education no 7 2013 pp 5862 92 Ding Guojia hexinliyi yu yatai xiaoguo waijiao zhanlue yanjiu p 174 93 Although conflicting economic interests are mentioned 94 eg Zhao Mingwen Zhong e quanxin de guojia hezuo moshi The new cooperation model between China and Russia Liaowang xinwen zhoukan Outlook weekly no 25 2009 p 56 INTA912FullIssueindb 264 05032015 142931 Securing Chinas core interests 265 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs partnership can enhance each countrys advantages and expand our space for cooperation to the maximum95 Not surprisingly one conclusion is that China should strengthen its strategic partnership with Russia96 We also find that some are critical of what is often portrayed in the West as a new revisionist of sorts SinoRussian alliance It is argued that antiWest cooper ation is not the core of SinoRussian relations and that both China and Russia do have to work with the West97 Accordingly establishing anything that is perceived simply as an antiUS alliance would actually make it harder for both to deal with the West and thus damage their ability to protect their core interests98 What then should China do to protect its core interests About a sixth 1574 per cent of articles argue that China should resolutely safeguard jianjue weihu its core interests The collapse of the Soviet Union is used an example to warn of the consequences of failing to defend national core interests For example one article argues that After 1989 the Soviet Union repeatedly yielded to international pressure and failed to take any effective action to protect its national unity It completely lost core interests and eventually disintegrated Thus whether core interests can be protected has vital implica tions for sovereign states99 While emphasizing the uncompromising stance on core interests 1018 per cent of articles argue that China could compromise on some noncore interests or look for ways to bargain and trade off core and noncore interests For example an article on the topic of SinoUS foreign exchange argues that if necessary we can certainly make concessions in disputes on secondary interests However regarding disputes on core interests we should not compromise100 Conclusion There is something of a groundswell around the idea that China should now be seeking to be more proactive in asserting and defending its core interests in an international order that often seems to be disinclined to change to facilitate Chinas rise to say the very least But there remain many voices of caution as well This caution is in part at least built on a realization that perceptions matter in international politics How China is seen by othersfor example if China is seen as being assertive or even nationalistically aggressivecan have real consequences if those others then initiate policies based on these perceptions to prevent China from getting what it wants 95 Zhao Zhong e quanxin de guojia hezuo moshi p 56 96 eg Z Li and B Li Zhuanjin zhiding zhongguo zai guoji zhanlue tongdao wenti shang de zhanlue duice p 112 97 eg Jiang Yi Bu kaopu de zhong e jiemengshuo SinoRussia alliance does not fly Shijie zhishi World affairs no 5 2012 pp 523 98 Jiang Bu kaopu de zhong e jiemengshuo p 53 99 Zhao Ba zhongguo de hexin liyi jieding de geng qingxi zhunque p 65 100 Zhang Lei Lun zhongmei shuangbian touzi xieding fanben guanyu waihui zhuanyi tiaokuan de fenqi The differences in model bilateral investment treaty of China and United States on foreign currency transference clause Shanghai jinrong Shanghai finance no 10 2013 p 93 INTA912FullIssueindb 265 05032015 142931 Jinghan Zeng Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin 266 International Affairs 91 2 2015 Copyright 2015 The Authors International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs We offer no value judgement on which approach is right or what methods China should pursue to protect its core interests Our much more modest intention in this article was simply to open up domestic discourses to a wider IR audience to show the contours of the Chinese debate on Chinas place in the world and the considerable plurality of ideas that can be found within this debate Using content analysis built around the construction of a rigorous coding manual which went through a number of iterations as the study evolved and problems were identified provides an excellent way of undertaking such a study Our systematic approach to studying Chinese texts not only involves conventional quantitativebased content analysis where methodological rigour is required but also entails making qualitative judgements on orientations where prowess in distinguishing nuances in the Chinese language is essential To be sure this is not the only way of trying to understand the intentions that are driving the nature of Chinas rise but it gives us the ability to analyse and articulate debates and discourses in a relatively large body of work in a relatively brief and concise manner Collectively the papers we have studied point to a consensus of sorts that China is misunderstood and that powerful forces are looking for any opportu nity to paint China in a negative light We might also suggest that they collectively point to a country that is trying to come to terms with its newfound power in the global order In particular the global financial crisis helped to change percep tions in China about its place in the world relative to other existing powers Wang Zaibang argues that the first two decades of the new millennium represent a strategic opportunity period for China as a result of a global adjustment in power distributions in which the crisis played a key part101 The debate over core interests is just one part of a wider process of Chinaor more correctly Chinese thinkerscoming to terms with this new status and working out how this theoretical power can best be translated into actual policies that serve national interests in ways that do not generate negative external responses The next task for the authors of this article then is to turn our attention to Chinese discourses on what means should be used to secure these interests 101 Wang Zaibang Shilun zhanlüe jiyuqi xin jieduan neihan yu tiaojian de bianhua Changing contexts and contents in the new strategic opportunity period Xiandai guoji guanxi Contemporary international rela tions no 2 2013 pp 16 INTA912FullIssueindb 266 05032015 142932